National history seems to be a form of history marked by a particularly strong relation between past and present. In the last few decades, the most serious historiographical conflicts, and the ones which have attracted public as well as scholarly attention, have tended to be those where national honour was felt to be at stake. Very often they have concerned either the foundation of the nation, or the national role in war, and sometimes both; think of the example of Japan, Israel, the United States, and Australia, to name just a few. These debates have attracted particular heat because history was seen to have implications not only for specialist historians but also for the morality and future of the nation.
Transforming Cultures eJournal Vol. This sequence of historiographical development and disputation has been clearly evident in Australia also. Australian histories written before World War II had emphasised Australia's place within the British Empire and had erased or minimized the history of colonization of indigenous peoples, putting in its place a story of settler and pioneer hardships. In some versions the story of settler hardship was a radical nationalist legend celebrating the itinerant male workers of the bush and the outback; in others it was a largely classless pioneer legend that celebrated those who had subdued the land for pastoralism and agriculture -small and large farmers, men and women alike. Australia's pioneering settlers were remembered as having endured the harshest continent on earth, with its endless drought, fire, and flood, their struggle most poignantly signified by the near starvation in the first years of settlement, or in the story of the selectors later in the century who attempted to carve out a living from an often unforgiving land.
Both versions of this pioneer national narrative were silent on race and ethnicity, referring only infrequently to non-British immigrants, and obscuring the dispossession of indigenous peoples almost entirely. In both, the hardships endured by white people, especially those of British or Irish origin, were at the heart of the narrative. In common with other colonial and settler societies, settler Australians developed narratives of reversal, placing indigenous people as the invaders and seeing the settlers as the defenders of their land. Like so many others, from the United States to Canada to Israel and elsewhere, settler Australians have tended to see themselves as victims, not oppressors. This reversal was noted as long ago as 1845, when visiting Polish Count Strzelecki observed that the indigenous people of Tasmania had been seen "as a sort of brute intruder" on lands that rightly belonged to the settlers.
2 They have seen themselves as the rightful owners of the land in contrast to indigenous peoples, perceived as nomads, whose hold upon it is tenuous and undeserved. In 1997, a contemporary indigenous leader, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, pointed to the irony of a situation in which Aboriginal people who stay on their own land as far as they are permitted, to protect it, become in white Australian mythology the wanderers, the nomads, on 'walkabout', while those inveterate wanderers, the European immigrants Tasmanians as best they could. That they were unable to realize this desire to protect was a product of historical circumstances, not of any intent on their part to destroy a whole people. Without intent, he argued, the concept of genocide cannot apply. There is, however, another possible response. This is that the term genocide is in fact applicable to Australian history. In this argument, Windschuttle, Reynolds, and Attwood can all be seen as having defined the term too narrowly. I want to present the case here for seeing genocide as a helpful concept in Australian history, as long as we define it carefully and especially address the vexed question of intent with historical knowledge and conceptual care. Thus the modern concept of 'genocide' originated with, and takes much of its modern relevance from, the example of the Holocaust, the outstanding modern case of the attempted destruction of a whole people. Yet it is also, from the beginning, a way of characterising long term historical processes, which could include colonisation, the destruction of a society and people and its attempted replacement by another society and people.
In the second half of the 1940s, Lemkin set out to write a two or three volume history of genocide. He developed a typology or framework for looking at a range of historical cases, and then studied about forty cases in turn. He went back to ancient history, to Carthage, and ended with twentieth century cases such as the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. He worked on the history in the late forties and early fifties, writing chapters at the same time as he was working tirelessly, and in the end successfully, to have the UN pass the Genocide Act. The Lemkin papers in the American Jewish Historical Society library in New York, and also in the New York City Library, include notes, plans, and draft chapters for an intended two or three-volume study of the history of genocide, and in particular they include a draft chapter on Tasmania. (There are also indications that he also drafted a more general chapter on Australia, but this chapter is not in these archives and may no longer exist.) Lemkin never published his book on the history of genocide, dying in 1959 before it could be completed.
In this draft chapter, which has since been published in Patterns of Prejudice (2005),
Lemkin applies his notion of genocide to Tasmania, using his own newly-developed method for assessing historical events as possible examples of genocide. This method meant investigating the historical background, the conditions leading to it, the methods and techniques used (whether massacre or deprivation of the foundations of life), the intent and motivation of the genocidists, the opposition to genocide within the genocidist group, the role of propaganda, the responses of the victim group and also of outside groups, and the aftermath and consequences. Using this framework, and relying 15 Such a definition clearly applied to the Australian case: as he said, "there is no dispute that the basic fact of Australian history is the appropriation of the continent by an invading people and the dispossession, with ruthless destructiveness, of another". There can also be no doubt, he says, "about the disintegration of Aboriginal society, traditional culture, and religion, the destruction of the Aborigines' economic existence, their languages, their personal security, liberty, health, and dignity". The process and the effect were clearly genocidal. The intent was less direct, being to take the land rather than destroy the people. It was only when Aborigines resisted the loss of their conditions of life that they were met with a determined settler and government response.
This seems to me a crucial point. If we look for instances of attempts to destroy a people, and especially of moments when this desire was clearly articulated, we will find, as Reynolds has done, limited instances of genocidal intent. But if we consider the question of intent indirectly, that is, that the intent was to take the land no matter what the consequences for indigenous people, then we can see a general pattern within colonisation of a degree of carelessness about the future of entire peoples that was so extreme it amounts to genocide. If we also consider that the consequences of land were not at all unpredictable or surprising -in the Australian case they were either known or predictable from experience in North America and the Caribbean -then the continued land seizure can be seen as a genocidal project. Perhaps some colonising decisions were made without this knowledge, but as time went on colonisers knew the likely consequences of their actions. As Roger Smith writes, of colonisers in general:
Sometimes … genocidal consequences precede any conscious decision to destroy innocent groups to satisfy one's aims. This is most often the case in the early phase of colonial domination, where through violence, disease, and relentless pressure indigenous peoples are pushed towards extinction. With the recognition of the consequences of one's acts, however, the issue is changed: to persist is to intend the death of a people. This pattern of pressure, recognition, and persistence is typically what happened in the nineteenth century.
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National, Imperial and Transnational Histories
These debates over settler history, indigenous history, frontier violence, and genocide and colonialism have been conducted largely within a national framework. Yet they have, of course, an imperial dimension as well. Clearly, despite moments of angst within British ruling elites in the 1830s in particular, the colonisation of Australia, with its dire consequences for Aboriginal people, was a British project. The events at issue in the Tasmanian case, and we could consider many others, occurred before there was an Australian nation as such; they happened in the context of a British colonial empire with a number of Australian colonies. And yet of course, it was also, if we read back from the present to the past, an Australian project. It was through dispossession and displacement that white Australian colonies and then the Australian nation were created.
Given that the claims of indigenous Australians have a strong historical component, so too does the reaction to those claims. In this way current politics and historical understandings are intimately bound together.
The mood in historiography, however, has become very transnational, a trend that can sometimes work against the political relevance of history, and at other times enhance it.
Historians everywhere are seeking to escape the national straitjacket of their work, extend their analyses, and appeal to wider audiences, but in the process face the danger of losing the national audiences they once had. This transnational desire has some particular implications for these bitter national historical disputes. One effect will be to recognise more clearly the debates of others, and to see the similarities and differences 
Finally, what is history anyway?
In his paper, "Building on Sand", Pappe tells us that one of the most challenging tasks in the Israeli debates has been not just providing a different historical narrative to the prevailing one, but in connecting the historical discussion to a more epistemological understanding of "what is history and how history is received by the public at large". He describes how in an historiographical conflict historians on both sides will be impatient with any suggestion of relativism (what he calls "soft relativism"): each side believes it is correct and that it can be shown to be so. And he argues that historians need to take time to explain to the public that sometimes what happened is not very clear, and that historical investigation is part of an ongoing process, in which historians are connected both to present conflicts and also to past ones, in a complex way.
In Australia, too, the debates over frontier violence have led to some interesting reconsideration of a range of epistemological and ethical issues. Some of the questions that have arisen in public debate are: Is it possible to have more than one true account? 
